// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"

#include <stddef.h>

#include <string>

#include "base/base_switches.h"
#include "base/command_line.h"
#include "base/debug/profiler.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/hash.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/memory/shared_memory.h"
#include "base/metrics/field_trial.h"
#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
#include "base/path_service.h"
#include "base/process/launch.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
#include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
#include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
#include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
#include "base/win/win_util.h"
#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
#include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
#include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
#include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"

#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
#include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h" // nogncheck: unused #ifdef NACL_WIN64
#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)

static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;

namespace content {
namespace {

    // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
    // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
    // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
    // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
    // of it, see:
    // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
    const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
        L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
        L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown.
        L"activedetect32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
        L"activedetect64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
        L"airfoilinject3.dll", // Airfoil.
        L"akinsofthook32.dll", // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
        L"assistant_x64.dll", // Unknown.
        L"avcuf64.dll", // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
        L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8.
        L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator.
        L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth.
        L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security.
        L"cmsetac.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
        L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris.
        L"cplushook.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
        L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock.
        L"easyhook32.dll", // GDIPP and others.
        L"esspd.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
        L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5.
        L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
        L"guard64.dll", // Comodo Internet Security x64.
        L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector.
        L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
        L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter.
        L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus.
        L"icatcdll.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
        L"icdcnl.dll", // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
        L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic).
        L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
        L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
        L"libdivx.dll", // DivX.
        L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam.
        L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library).
        L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour.
        L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus.
        L"mpk.dll", // KGB Spy.
        L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX.
        L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008.
        L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older).
        L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor.
        L"pastali32.dll", // PastaLeads.
        L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security.
        L"pavlsphook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
        L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
        L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
        L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus.
        L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
        L"picrmi32.dll", // PicRec.
        L"picrmi64.dll", // PicRec.
        L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems.
        L"protector.dll", // Unknown (suspected malware).
        L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
        L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
        L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
        L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone.
        L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport.
        L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
        L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
        L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security.
        L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor.
        L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown.
        L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2.
        L"sdhook32.dll", // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
        L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard).
        L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6.
        L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5.
        L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX.
        L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface.
        L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus.
        L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools).
        L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
        L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop.
        L"windowsapihookdll32.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
        L"windowsapihookdll64.dll", // Lenovo One Key Theater (crbug.com/536056).
        L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006.
    };

#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
    // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
    // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
    // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
    bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
        sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
        sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
    {
        base::FilePath directory;
        if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
            return false;

        if (sub_dir)
            directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));

        sandbox::ResultCode result;
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
            directory.value().c_str());
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return false;

        std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
        if (children)
            directory_str += L"*";
        // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.

        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
            directory_str.c_str());
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return false;

        return true;
    }
#endif // !defined(NACL_WIN64)

    // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
    bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name)
    {
        wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
        DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
        if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
            // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
            return false;
        }
        if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
            return false;
        base::FilePath fname(path);
        return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
    }

    // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
    // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
    // is also loaded in this process.
    void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
        bool check_in_browser,
        sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
    {
        HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
        if (!module) {
            // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
            // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
            // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
            std::wstring name(module_name);
            size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
            DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
            DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
            if (period <= 8)
                return;
            for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
                const wchar_t suffix[] = { '~', ix, 0 };
                std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
                alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
                if (check_in_browser) {
                    module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
                    if (!module)
                        return;
                    // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
                    // want to make sure it is the right one.
                    if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
                        return;
                }
                // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
                policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
            }
        }
        policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
        DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
        return;
    }

    // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
    // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
    // does not get a chance to execute any code.
    void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
    {
        for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
            BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
    }

    // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
    base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object)
    {
        // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
        static DWORD s_session_id = 0;
        if (s_session_id == 0) {
            HANDLE token;
            DWORD session_id_length;
            DWORD session_id = 0;

            CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
            CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
                sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
            CloseHandle(token);
            if (session_id)
                s_session_id = session_id;
        }

        return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%lu%ls", s_session_id, object);
    }

    // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
    bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line)
    {
        if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
            return true;

        // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
        // job.
        if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
            return true;

        BOOL in_job = true;
        // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
        if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
            NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
        if (!in_job)
            return true;

        // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
        JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {};
        if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
                JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
                sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
            NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
            return true;
        }
        if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
            return true;

        return false;
    }

    // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
    sandbox::ResultCode AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
    {
        sandbox::ResultCode result;

        // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
        // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
        // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;

        // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
        // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
        // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
        // system services.
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;

        // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
        // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;

            // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
#ifndef NDEBUG
        base::FilePath app_dir;
        if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
            return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;

        wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
        DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
            long_path_buf,
            MAX_PATH);
        if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
            return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_NO_SPACE;

        base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
        debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
            debug_message.value().c_str());
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
#endif // NDEBUG

            // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces.
#if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
        base::FilePath exe;
        if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
            return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
        base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
        result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
            pdb_path.value().c_str());
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
#endif

#if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
        DWORD coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
        if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
            LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
        } else {
            std::wstring coverage_dir;
            wchar_t* coverage_dir_str = base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
            coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
                L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
            CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
            base::FilePath sancov_path = base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
            result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
                sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
                sancov_path.value().c_str());
            if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
                return result;
        }
#endif

        AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
        return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
    }

    void LogLaunchWarning(sandbox::ResultCode last_warning, DWORD last_error)
    {
        UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.WarningResultCode",
            last_warning);
        UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Warning", last_error);
    }

    sandbox::ResultCode AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(
        sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
    {
        sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;

        // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
        if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
            result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;

        // Close the proxy settings on XP.
        if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
            result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
                L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\"
                L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;

        sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
        if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
            // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
            // token is restricted.
            initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
        }

        result = policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
        // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
        result = policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
        result = policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
        policy->SetLockdownDefaultDacl();

        result = policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
            // We ignore the result of setting the alternate desktop, however log
            // a launch warning.
            LogLaunchWarning(result, ::GetLastError());
            DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
            result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
        }

        return result;
    }

    // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
    // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
    // command_line as needed.
    void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line)
    {
        const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line = *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
        std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
        if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
            // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
            std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
                switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
            if (value.empty() || value == type) {
                command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
            }
            command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
        }
    }

// This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
// DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
    base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;

    typedef BOOL(WINAPI* DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
        HANDLE source_handle,
        HANDLE target_process_handle,
        LPHANDLE target_handle,
        DWORD desired_access,
        BOOL inherit_handle,
        DWORD options);

    DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;

    NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;

    static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning = "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
                                                 " process.\n Please contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";

    void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle)
    {
        // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
        BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
        OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info = reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
        ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
        NTSTATUS error;
        error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
        CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
        type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';

        // Get the object basic information.
        OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
        size = sizeof(basic_info);
        error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
            &size);
        CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));

        CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;

        if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
            const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
            CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
        }
    }

    BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
        HANDLE source_handle,
        HANDLE target_process_handle,
        LPHANDLE target_handle,
        DWORD desired_access,
        BOOL inherit_handle,
        DWORD options)
    {
        // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
        if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
                target_process_handle, target_handle,
                desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
            return FALSE;

        // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
        if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle || target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
            return TRUE;

        // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
        BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
        if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
            // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
            if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
                HANDLE temp_handle;
                CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
                    target_process_handle,
                    ::GetCurrentProcess(),
                    &temp_handle,
                    PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
                    FALSE, 0));
                base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
                CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
            }
        }

        if (is_in_job) {
            // We never allow inheritable child handles.
            CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;

            // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
            HANDLE temp_handle;
            CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
                ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
                0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
            base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);

            // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
            CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
        }

        return TRUE;
    }
#endif

    bool IsAppContainerEnabled()
    {
        if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
            return false;
        const base::CommandLine& command_line = *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
        const std::string appcontainer_group_name = base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName("EnableAppContainer");
        if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppContainer))
            return false;
        if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer))
            return true;
        return base::StartsWith(appcontainer_group_name, "Enabled",
            base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
    }

} // namespace

sandbox::ResultCode SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
    sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
    uint32_t ui_exceptions,
    sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
{
    if (!ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
        return policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);

#ifdef _WIN64
    sandbox::ResultCode ret = policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
    if (ret != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
        return ret;
#endif
    return policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
}

// TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
// Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
sandbox::ResultCode AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy)
{
    // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
    base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
        L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
    return policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
}

sandbox::ResultCode AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy,
    const wchar_t* sid)
{
    if (IsAppContainerEnabled())
        return policy->SetLowBox(sid);
    return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}

sandbox::ResultCode AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy,
    bool enable_opm)
{
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
    if (!IsWin32kLockdownEnabled())
        return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;

    // Enable win32k lockdown if not already.
    sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations();
    if ((flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) == sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE)
        return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;

    sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
        enable_opm ? sandbox::TargetPolicy::IMPLEMENT_OPM_APIS
                   : sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT,
        nullptr);
    if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
        return result;
    if (enable_opm)
        policy->SetEnableOPMRedirection();

    flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
    return policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags);
#else
    return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
#endif
}

bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services)
{
    // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
    //               See <http://b/1287166>.
    DCHECK(broker_services);
    DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
    sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
    g_broker_services = broker_services;

    // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
#ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
    BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
    CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
    // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
    // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
    // original function.
    if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() && !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
        HMODULE module = NULL;
        wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
        CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
            reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
            &module));
        DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
        if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
            ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
            result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
                module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
                DuplicateHandlePatch);
            CHECK(result == 0);
            g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
                g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
        }
    }
#endif

    return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
}

bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services)
{
    DCHECK(target_services);
    sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
    return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
}

sandbox::ResultCode StartSandboxedProcess(
    SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
    base::CommandLine* cmd_line,
    const base::HandlesToInheritVector& handles_to_inherit,
    base::Process* process)
{
    DCHECK(delegate);
    const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line = *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
    std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);

    TRACE_EVENT1("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess", "type", type_str);

    // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
    if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) && !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
        cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
    }

    ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);

    if ((!delegate->ShouldSandbox()) || browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) || cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
        base::LaunchOptions options;

        base::HandlesToInheritVector handles = handles_to_inherit;
        if (!handles_to_inherit.empty()) {
            options.inherit_handles = true;
            options.handles_to_inherit = &handles;
        }
        base::Process unsandboxed_process = base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, options);

        *process = std::move(unsandboxed_process);
        return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
    }

    sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();

    // Add any handles to be inherited to the policy.
    for (HANDLE handle : handles_to_inherit)
        policy->AddHandleToShare(handle);

    // Pre-startup mitigations.
    sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE | sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP | sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK | sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP | sandbox::MITIGATION_NONSYSTEM_FONT_DISABLE | sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_REMOTE | sandbox::MITIGATION_IMAGE_LOAD_NO_LOW_LABEL;

    if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWinSboxDisableExtensionPoints))
        mitigations |= sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE;

    sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC;
    result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations);

    if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
        return result;

#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
    if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess && IsWin32kLockdownEnabled()) {
        result = AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy, false);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
    }
#endif

    // Post-startup mitigations.
    mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS | sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;

    result = policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations);
    if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
        return result;

    result = SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
    if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
        return result;

    if (!delegate->DisableDefaultPolicy()) {
        result = AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy);
        if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
            return result;
    }

#if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
    if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess || type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
        AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS, NULL, true,
            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, policy);
    }
#endif

    if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
        // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
        // this subprocess. See
        // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
        cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
    }

    result = AddGenericPolicy(policy);

    if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
        NOTREACHED();
        return result;
    }

    // Allow the renderer and gpu processes to access the log file.
    if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess || type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
        if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) {
            DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute());
            result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
                sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
                logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str());
            if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
                return result;
        }
    }

    // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
    // have no effect. These calls can fail with SBOX_ERROR_BAD_PARAMS.
    policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
    policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));

    if (!delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy))
        return sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_DELEGATE_PRE_SPAWN;

    TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");

    PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
    sandbox::ResultCode last_warning = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
    DWORD last_error = ERROR_SUCCESS;
    result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
        cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
        cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(), policy, &last_warning,
        &last_error, &temp_process_info);

    base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);

    TRACE_EVENT_END0("startup", "StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS");

    if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
        UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error", last_error);
        if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
            DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
        else
            DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;

        return result;
    }

    if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != last_warning) {
        LogLaunchWarning(last_warning, last_error);
    }

    delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());

    CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != static_cast<DWORD>(-1));
    *process = base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
    return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
}

} // namespace content
